The Integration of Western Europe

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THE INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

The construction of a united Europe, the remodeling of the Western half of the Continent into an economic-political unity within the framework of the Atlantic community, constitutes one of the major problems of our times. Both America and Russia could pursue their development according to their own intrinsic laws if Western Europe simply did not exist at all. But the fact that Western Europe does exist, and that it has as yet found neither its new form nor its final position in the world political pattern, aggravates the world-wide political tension. Thus the further development of Western Europe is not merely a Western European affair. Both the United States and Russia have long understood this, and both of them endeavor to influence Western Europe's development in accordance with their own interests. They both call for integration, but this word has a different meaning depending on whether it is used by Washington or by Moscow. The Russian method of integration consists in creating a sort of telephone network, which connects every subscriber with the central telephone exchange but makes inadequate provision for direct lines between them. The Americans take a quite different view of the Western European problem: they are pressing for the unification of Western Europe as a region and would consider it as an advantage for the Atlantic community to have a sound and united Western Europe participate in their joint efforts as a partner, along with a rapidly progressing Canada.

Integration thus constitutes a much more complex problem for the Western world than it does for the East, where the solution envisaged would consist in a simple dictatorial move. Integration in the Western sense must primarily be a consciously voluntary act. Walter Lippmann wrote: "It may be that the French could be dragooned into ratifying EDC . . . but it will be a poor kind of diplomatic victory. . . ."[1] And one of the leading advocators of Western European integration, the Dutch

[1] *New York Herald Tribune*, European Ed. Nov. 3, 1953.

Foreign Minister J. W. Beyen, stated along the same lines: "The vital European question is, whether a supra-national policy will be agreed upon voluntarily and freely, or whether it will be forced upon us in the form of an intervention from outside." [2]

The fact that the United States, as opposed to Soviet Russia, does not exercise any direct pressure on the countries coöperating with her is the reason for the slower rhythm of development. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that a final failure of the European Defense Community would, necessarily, lead to an "agonizing reappraisal" of the entire American defense policy. This statement cannot be interpreted, however, as direct pressure on France and Italy, since Mr. Dulles did not set a term for ratification; nor did he attempt to formulate an alternate form of United States defense policy. The satellite countries of Eastern Europe began their integration process before even beginning to realize what such a process would cost them; and when finally they did realize this, it was too late to retrace their steps or even to stop in their tracks.

We must now touch upon the question as to why the nations of Western Europe—who undoubtedly are endowed with the greatest heritage of general culture—need so much time to discover basic truths which will appear absolutely self-evident in historical retrospect. They cling to the concept of national sovereignty as if it were a gospel derived from the laws of nature, fearing that any deviation from that concept would bring about the death of their nation. As late as 1953 a well-known Sorbonne professor stated: "*La souveraineté nationale est une et indivisible.*" But men had lived for thousands of years before the concept of national sovereignty was even known! National sovereignty is merely the political expression of a technical and cultural *niveau*, some kind of magic formula used in political calculations. Its only objective is to enable the people and the nation to realize their common aspirations to the largest possible extent. These aspirations are subject to change, but they remain much the same during a given era. In our world of today these aims are security and prosperity. From this point of view national

[2] Lecture delivered in Basle, on Sept. 4, 1953.

sovereignty still offers the best formula as far as the United States and Russia are concerned, but this philosophy becomes obsolete when applied to Western Europe, since such small political units can neither defend themselves nor achieve substantial economic progress on their own. Western Europe therefore must sacrifice parts of its national sovereignties in order to achieve a political way of life leading toward greater security and increased prosperity.[3]

What Is Meant by Integration?

The attempted federation of Western Europe shows only superficial similarities with the development which took place six and a half centuries ago in Switzerland and 150 years ago in North America. In both those cases there was an integration of political structures which had not yet developed any cultural individualities and which, economically, did not differ from each other to any large extent. Paul-Henri Spaak made this clear in Strasbourg in November 1951 at a meeting between members of the United States Congress and various European parliaments. He pointed to three major mental blocks which are dividing the peoples of Western Europe: the multitude of languages, vested interests in each individual national economic structure, and the memory of past foreign occupation. (In this respect England and Sweden constitute exceptions.)

Although well aware of these facts, Paul G. Hoffman, then Administrator of the Economic Co-operation Administration, addressing the Council of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation on October 31, 1949, ventured to put forward the idea of integration. This word sounded so stupendous at the time that serious efforts to give a closer definition of it were not made until some time later. With reference to the economic significance of the term, Mr. Hoffman himself supplied a definition:

> The substance of such integration would be the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restrictions . . . and eventually all tariffs are permanently swept away.

[3] Even as a federation of states, Western Europe could not achieve complete economic and tactical independence; this, however, is due to geographical and economic factors, which fall outside the scope of this essay.

The formula of the French political writer Raymond Aron reflects the same thought in other terms:

> Two different economic units may be said to be the more highly integrated when transactions between two individuals, one in each of the two units, resemble transactions between two individuals in the same unit.[4]

The creation of the Coal and Steel Community aims at this objective, at least with regard to six countries and within the restricted scope of two basic materials. However, there still exist widely divergent views as to what should be understood by political integration and how such a concept could be translated into reality; and as usual in cases of such divergence, the differences of opinion frustrate any form of positive progress. The drafting of a European constitution, the task assigned to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community under the chairmanship of Heinrich v. Brentano, the German delegate, in the winter of 1952, has so far given rise to more controversy than agreement. For that reason, the so-called "Luxembourg Plan" has recently been advanced, according to which any further work on the European constitution is to be held in abeyance. One special point contained in that Plan should, however, be specifically stressed and be translated into reality as soon as practicable: the election of a European Parliament, through direct, popular vote. (It should be recalled that both the Council of Europe and the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community are composed of delegates of the various national parliaments.) This new European Parliament would have one main task which would consist of adopting the balance of the constituent parts of a European constitution. Thereby, its supporters hope that this constitution would gain respect in the realm of public opinion of the various member countries and its acceptance would be facilitated.

Any form of political union presupposes the subordination of individual and immediate interests to more far-reaching joint objectives. The Dutch politician J. W. Beyen, in the speech referred to above, draws a striking picture of the psychological difficulties inextricably connected with any such attempts

[4] *Lloyds Bank Review*, April 1953.

> It is far easier to induce people to sacrifice their individual interests under the pressure of an enemy threat, than to unite them in voluntary and peaceful coöperation for their common interest without the existence of any such outside threat.

To the extent that it is conscious of the Russian threat, Western Europe is prepared to engage in joint action, but even that willingness is limited by certain mental reservations. The firm attachment to the unanimity clause as regards any intergovernmental agreements since the end of the war (Brussels Pact, Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Council of Europe) shows that Europeans do not have full confidence in the principle of coöperation and do not want to accept directives even from a qualified majority. Only once so far has integration in its true sense succeeded in Europe, that is, in connection with the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community. This success should probably be credited to two particularly favorable circumstances: the Pool was concerned with two branches of the economic development, traditionally connected in public opinion with the concept of international cartels; and the Russian threat to the free world appeared particularly acute at that time. Had the Coal and Steel Pool agreement been submitted at a later date than it actually was (May 1951), it would never have been signed, and if the ratification process in the six parliaments had been delayed for one reason or another, ratification would probably have become impossible by the spring of 1952.

No other form of coöperation offers Western Europe better prospects for revival than integration. A condition precedent to integration must naturally be an effort to respect national characteristics in so far as they are compatible with common and basic Western European interests. In this connection Western Europe has one point in common with the United States, while fundamentally differing from her on another. The United States and Western Europe both comprise wide areas encompassing completely different economic and living conditions, but, whereas in the United States this factor does not in any important way affect the spiritual unity of the inhabitants, the same factors are being overemphasized in Europe. Therefore, Western

European integration can succeed only if entered upon with the utmost caution, limiting the competence of the supra-national authority initially to as few sectors of political life as possible, and giving sufficient leeway to individual national feelings.

Nevertheless—in view of the fact that the peoples of Western Europe cling so closely to their spiritual characteristics, and that the politically developed strata so stubbornly adhere to the concept of national sovereignty—it would be doubly desirable to emphasize the supra-national character of this integration from the beginning and to use it as the cornerstone of all the common institutions. Such coöperation can succeed only if rivalries, susceptibilities and national vanity are discarded in favor of a common discipline. And since this aim—with the exception of the Coal and Steel Community—has not as yet been attained in any field of endeavor, the organization of Western European coöperation remains a laboriously slow undertaking. In responsible quarters concerned with these questions, the idea has become firmly established that the OEEC operates satisfactorily even on an inter-governmental level; as regards the Council of Europe, however, these very quarters show only a very slight interest, while public opinion shows even less. Does not this difference in appreciation emanate from the fact that the OEEC was handling the distribution of the dollar aid, whereas a pronouncement on political problems in Strasbourg did not entail any such immediately tangible advantages?

Opposite Political Currents

All the peoples and governments of Western Europe harbor a common desire to strengthen coöperation, but cannot agree among themselves as to its extent and methods. The problem is further complicated by the fact that many countries reflect variations in their domestic policies in their dealings with their European partners.

At the start Great Britain was inclined merely to advocate a friendly, informal understanding based on frequent consultations. Even today, her reaction to the invitations from the Continent remains, psychologically and politically, a firm "No." Originally, France very much favored a closely knit integration,

to be achieved through the creation of strong supra-national organizations, but she has changed her attitude, beginning in early 1953. In the Benelux countries the trend developed in the opposite direction: originally Belgium was for and Holland rather against close integration. In the meantime, however, both have softened their attitudes. Germany and Italy were firmly in favor of a supra-national organization, in part for variable reasons. These attitudes call for an explanation.

The British fear that a written agreement would bind them, even if at a later date a concrete issue should arise against the background of a different general situation. Furthermore the London government constantly refers to its obligations to the Commonwealth, asserting that these preclude firm political obligations in Western Europe. We must admit that, as far as the psychological argument goes, the continental situation is rather confused. But, on analysis, the political argument sounds rather like a pretext, particularly in view of the fact that conferences of the premiers of the Commonwealth have twice given England the "green light". Despite that go-ahead signal, England subsequently maintained that she still was unable to participate actively in continental integration. This pretext is invoked, presumably, so that England shall not be definitely condemned to play merely the part of *primus inter pares* on the Continent.

The unexpected rise of Germany, with the danger that an integrated Continent would be increasingly exposed to German influence, was the reason for the rather abrupt change in France's European policy. Instead of incorporating this growing source of strength in the integrated whole at the very beginning through a bold political reform and thus making it a useful component of the European "nucleus", many French statesmen seem to be seeking a means of limiting and influencing Germany's use of her forces—an undertaking which has never met with lasting success at any time in the course of history.

In the beginning Italy enthusiastically supported organic Western European integration, on the assumption that this constituted the best means of leveling out differences between former victors and losers. In view of the fact that this cycle

had already run its full course, however, in the form of Italy's partnership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the integration current emerged considerably weakened from the last Italian elections. For the time being this same leveling argument still applies to Germany; furthermore, all clear-thinking Germans know that they have always been mentally oscillating between humility and excessive pride. At the start, they therefore aspired to ties within the framework of an integrated Western Europe, in order to shed their humility complex; and they maintain this attitude today, in order not to be tempted to aspire beyond their normal rôle within the scope of such a pattern. On the other hand, the Socialists have been against any type of integration with the West from the very beginning, because they deem the reunification of the two parts of Germany more important, and fear that the realization of their main political aim would become more difficult if such an integration were to take place. The Right wing of German political parties opposes integration because it would raise serious obstacles to the free development of excessive national pride, which is one of the basic characteristics of its political thinking.

In spite of continental disagreement, the integration of at least the six countries forming the European "nucleus" would have progressed more rapidly, had not Great Britain initially opposed such a development. That is the reason why the Coal and Steel Community was formed outside the Council of Europe. Not until its breach with Strasbourg had become a reality, and the Coal and Steel Community had been constituted independently, did London realize its mistake; the British government then made its first, but important, step toward integration, declaring on August 2, 1952 that it would no longer oppose regional special agreements within the framework of the Council of Europe. Since then England has entered into close relations with the Coal and Steel Community, an arrangement which seems to work out quite satisfactorily, and on September 23, 1953, Under Secretary of State Anthony Nutting, on behalf of the British government, stated in Strasbourg that it wanted to coöperate more closely with the European Defense Community than its previous attitude might have indicated.

A new pattern of international relations is thus in the making in Western Europe. To the extent that further agreements concerning a limited coöperation will be concluded, integration will be limited to the continental countries, but existing and future structures will develop their relationships with England and probably also with the three Scandinavian states, on the basis of special agreements. Only the continental alliances will be supra-national; thus the word integration in its true sense will apply only to the Continent. But the less organic and more temporary agreements with England and the Scandinavian group, concluded individually from case to case, may also prove very useful, particularly if, in the course of a few decades, they imperceptibly harden into some sort of Western European political tradition, firmly anchored in the soul of its peoples.

The Council of Europe Has Not Lived up to Expectations

In April 1949, when the Council of Europe was created, it seemed destined to become both a starting and a rallying point for all efforts aimed at European integration. These hopes, however, did not come true. With the exception only of the recent plan to settle the Saar dispute between France and Germany, subsequent initiatives did not come from Strasbourg, nor were they translated into action there. There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon.

The Council of Europe was conceived as a "European" body in the true sense of the word and intended to rally all the free European countries (with the exception of Spain). It did not, however, offer the same advantages as the OEEC, which was charged with allocating credits and with organizing the economic pattern of Europe. Thus the Council of Europe did not have a sufficient reserve of centripetal power. It soon became obvious that the Council's terms of reference were too broad. Too many special interests clashed in Strasbourg and the Consultative Assembly soon split into two groups: one of them comprised countries which were interested only in seeking preliminary contacts—primarily Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries—and the other consisted of countries preparing for true integra-

tion, that is, the group of six countries which now form the European "nucleus".

This fundamental difference not only obstructed agreement in Strasbourg, but also rendered even more difficult the coöperation between the Consultative Assembly (the Strasbourg parliament) and the Commitee of Ministers (which is all-powerful, within the terms of the statutes of the Council of Europe). Originally, the Committee of Ministers reserved the right to define the scope of the problems which the Assembly would be permitted to discuss, and, as a matter of principle, military problems thus were at the beginning outside the competence of the Assembly. Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers is free to consider or disregard any recommendations made by the Assembly, and in most cases it did the latter. The debates of the Assembly were gradually reduced to the level of academic recommendations and the definition of national approaches to various problems; not until last September, during the debate on Paul-Henri Spaak's report on the common Western European policy toward Russia, did the Assembly act in a "European" spirit, trying to amalgamate the various national attitudes into a supra-national synthesis.

The development up to date is even more disappointing in view of the fact that every meeting of the Strasbourg Assembly brought together the most outstanding representatives of Western European parliamentary life. The psychological inhibitions there may be considerably attributed to the fact that the Strasbourg organization, like the European idea as a whole, does not meet with any real response among the broad masses. Certainly the representatives of the peoples should have the courage to think and act in a European way in their national parliaments and even more so in a European Assembly, but we must remember that many of them harbor doubts, since their electorate has not clearly given them this mandate.

We have touched upon the crux of the question: why is such a beautifully imagined political institution as the Council of Europe at a standstill, and almost unnoticed by the masses? What Western Europe lacks is methodical, lasting information media, operating with the help of modern technique and supplied with sufficient financial support. Now and again, it is true, the

European Movement tries to fill the gap, but it lacks funds and, apparently, an efficient central organization; furthermore, its information materials reach only those who are already predisposed toward positive European thought. The Western European countries (with the exception of Spain and Portugal) have a democratic structure, and their political life is rooted in their parliaments. Therefore, such an important political development as European integration cannot be realized without positive action on the part of public opinion—and obviously never against it. Again and again ideas have been advanced and projects planned, but in vain. With the single exception of the Coal and Steel Community, no real integration project has been crowned by success, because governments were concerned about the attitudes of their parliaments, and the members of parliament were concerned about the reaction of their electorate. You cannot start building a pyramid from the top, and as long as the base of European integration is not the broad masses, any new project will necessarily meet with indifference, if not outright refusal. Because of this basic shortcoming, limited single projects are more likely to meet with success than concepts of a more general, wider scope. Thus the Council of Europe, for the time being, will continue to be condemned to a rather subordinate part, although its recent achievement in the matter of the Saar is highly creditable and holds out promise of further valuable contributions in connection with problems of limited scope.

The Organization for European Economic Co-operation

The OEEC is the oldest of the joint organizations which were formed in Western Europe after the end of the war. Among the consultative organizations the OEEC has proved to be by far the most effective. Its original task, the allocation of dollar aid and the leadership of European reconstruction, has been completed; in the meantime, however, the Organization has turned, with gratifying success, toward the establishment of an intra-European payments union and the fight for trade liberalization, opposing quota restrictions and discriminatory measures that obstruct trade among the participating countries. Joint action in these two fields was so urgently called for that the early

opponents of it did not question the objectives of these moves, but rather the working methods involved in them.

This favorable basis for the activities of the OEEC should, however, not lead us to overlook the weakness of the organization. As it does not have any supra-national powers, every decision must be made unanimously by the participating countries. The fact that the OEEC, in spite of such obstacles, has been able to achieve positive results is obviously due to the advantages it had to offer. Frictions, of course, did arise within the European Payments Union, particularly because certain countries had accumulated too-considerable credits and attempted to get a larger percentage of gold in the clearing. They protested, fretted and threatened, but nevertheless remained members of the Organization in order to continue to enjoy the advantages it offered—particularly the prohibition of discriminatory measures in trade relationship between member countries. In one case, when Germany had accumulated too large a debit balance, the Organization acted in an advisory capacity, and the rapid restoration of the German foreign trade balance in 1951 can, to a considerable extent, be chalked up to the credit of the OEEC.

The fact that the OEEC does not have any supra-national authority, however, has prevented it from any effective intervention in French economic and financial policies; and since 1952 France has constituted a stumbling block to further liberalization of intra-European trade. Luckily, a general improvement of the economic situation in all of Western Europe has made it possible for France to settle her financial obligations within the scope of the European Payments Union out of her own means; and the Governor of the Bank of France recently stated that France was in a position to participate in a collective action tending toward the return of free convertibility. As regards her economic obligations, that is, trade liberalization, she is still slow and hesitating in their fulfillment. In any event, it is only indirectly because of the efforts of the OEEC that the liberalization of the trade and payment traffic between its member states has brought about an improvement in the economic situation of each of them.

It would certainly be an advantage to the various participating countries if the OEEC could obtain more powers, in order to

prevent mistakes in the individual national economic policies and to influence the economic development of the various participating countries according to the aim of the Organization. A reference of the Secretary General of the OEEC, Robert Marjolin, in a speech at the Congress of the Parliamentarians of the European Movement in Paris, in May 1954, shows how very far the Organization still remains from that ultimate aim. In his opinion, unanimous decisions, even though limited in scope in order to reach unanimity, are preferable to majority decisions which would be executed only unwillingly and incompletely by the dissenting countries if they deviated too far from national economic policy and goals.

Thus, the main problem of the OEEC has been and remains the creation of international discipline in currency and economic questions. Its congenital weakness, referred to above, will become increasingly noticeable in the course of the gradual return to the convertibility of Western European currencies. If one single country—or a limited number of countries—should adopt a policy of convertibility, at the expense of free foreign trade, this would only *seem* to be a step forward; intra-European trade constitutes such a considerable part of the total foreign trade of the OEEC countries that convertibility of currencies—however valuable it may be—would become too expensive a victory if it had to be bought at the cost of trade liberalization, or by raising the existing customs barriers.

The work of the OEEC therefore constitutes a kind of "test case" with respect to Western European integration. If the Organization, while working on a consultative basis, can succeed in creating a common discipline and securing observance of that discipline, it will have proved that Western Europe can accomplish constant and guaranteed coöperation according to the pattern recommended by the British, that is, without any supra-national arrangements.

The European Coal and Steel Community—The Showpiece of Integration

As a supra-national organization, the High Authority—the executive body of the Coal and Steel Community—can devote itself exclusively to its great and complex tasks. It has created

a common market, abolished customs barriers and lifted quota restrictions, but it has not as yet eliminated cartels and is presently tackling other major problems such as cheaper railway rates for "through" transports, facilities for the crossing of international frontiers within the Community and the equal pricing of steel sold by the Community to all consumers.

If the undoubted initial successes of the Community have not been in themselves sufficient to insure the victory of the supra-national idea, at least among the six countries of the European "nucleus", a considerable part of the reason lies in the fact that the positive results of the common market have not yet been understood in all quarters, while, on the other hand, those industrialists who were immediately concerned have already felt the impact of its negative results. Strange though it may sound, the general attitude in political and high economic circles in these six countries today is less favorable to such agreements than it was when their success was more questionable. The European Defense Community and other preliminary projects, therefore, could not in any way benefit from the similarity of their pattern to that of the Coal and Steel Community. Large political and economic groups spare no arguments to engineer the collapse of these projects. They question the viability not only of the proposed organizations but even of the already existing Coal and Steel Community, and they predict its final collapse, while endeavoring, with all the means at their disposal, to precipitate this.

Under prevailing circumstances, therefore, the Coal and Steel Community cannot be used as the example for other integration projects. As regards political problems, it goes too far, uncompromisingly subordinating national interests to supranational objectives; on the other hand, it is dismissed in economic quarters as a prototype, since it covers merely two raw materials, which traditionally have been produced, priced, distributed and exported under conditions largely affected by international considerations. This, however, is a unique state of facts, the exception which cannot be taken as a rule. This, also, is the argument of business circles which would like to keep their current freedom of movement within their own economic branch of the domestic market.

The European Defense Community— The Do or Die of Integration

In the minds of the six peoples forming the "nucleus" of Europe, the EDC touches what President Lincoln called "the mystic chords of memory". However much these peoples may yearn for an understanding with their neighbors, these aspirations for a better future cannot erase the memories of a thousand years of strife. Their protection against assault, plunder and foreign occupation has been in the hands of their own armies during their entire history. To give up these national armies and entrust their defense policy to a supra-national organization looks to many a Frenchman like an adventure in foreign policy. A poll conducted by the French magazine *Réalités* at the beginning of November 1953 showed that even in France 46 per cent of the replies were for and only 22 per cent against the EDC; 19 per cent had not formed any opinion and 13 per cent did not want to express one. This is not a bad result, but what is distressing is that hardly anybody took notice of this poll. The formation of a group of 200 anti-EDC members of Parliament out of a total of 900 seemed much more newsworthy. This fortuitous juxtaposition of two attitudes reflects in a flash the problem of continental integration. Its progress is being slowed down, though probably not definitively obstructed, because the opposition fights actively while its supporters pursue a policy of watchful waiting.

The EDC also involves difficult psychological problems. The French want to be the leading Power on the Continent, not because they feel strong but because they feel weak. In order not to fall under German leadership they claim the leading part for themselves. The Germans accept EDC today because they have now reached, in their recovery process, a stage of convalescence after an era of humility, and the EDC thus corresponds to an attitude accepted by broad segments of the German nation. The small nations are still turning toward France for leadership, because they have fallen into the habit since the First World War, but they no longer have any real confidence in France's leadership. This may appear completely incomprehensible in the United States, where the exclusive nationalism of the Euro-

peans is unknown. In America, nationalism is a constructive force, in Western Europe largely a defensive attitude. For this reason the European Army is subject to different appreciations on the two sides of the Atlantic. American officers calculate the fire-power of a division, but in Western Europe the country of origin of the guns is a matter of importance as well. Therefore, nobody in Western Europe, except possibly a segment of the German population, really loves the EDC, not even its most ardent advocators. During his press conference at the last NATO Ministerial Meeting, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. W. Beyen, for instance, asserted that EDC was not an aim in itself but, in the last analysis, only a means, even though one of the most effective means, to further the integration of Western Europe into a political and economic unit. The ex-president of the French Council of Ministers, Robert Schuman, recently expressed the same opinion, thus reëmphasizing that the French ratification of EDC is more and more becoming the central point in the over-all policy of Western European integration.

The European Constitution

For years a theoretical fight has been raging in Western Europe as to whether efforts tending toward integration should be placed on a functional or a federal level. The former alternative means the creation of joint organizations with a limited sphere of activity but with supra-national powers (Coal and Steel Community), while the latter implies the creation of a broad political framework, gradually expanding to comprise organized coöperation to an ever-increasing extent. The project relative to a European constitution falls within the scope of the latter alternative. It must be characterized, however, as a bold political jump into the future, since the peoples of Europe have in no way been sufficiently prepared for such a reform. The gap between its objectives and its practical possibilities became obvious in the course of the work of attempting to draft such a document. The right of objection on the part of the member states against any decisions made by the central authority is to be safeguarded to a much higher extent than in Switzerland or the United States, since each national element fears

that it might sell its national sovereignty for a dish of federal lentil soup, and that within the scope of the new structure a majority might satisfy its aspirations at the expense of a minority. Therefore the Western European Senate—provided the European constitution were to be drafted under the conditions prevailing today—would play a much more important part in domestic politics in the member states than is the case in America or in Switzerland. What is much more serious, a Council of Ministers representing the national governments would have to be created. A number of specified measures would have to be approved—unanimously or by qualified majority—by this Council. Thus, the principle of federation, should it ever materialize in the shape of the draft constitution, would emerge heavily mauled.

Within every federal nation, the member states are the real sources of sovereignty; the federal organs merely exercise those powers which have been explicitly entrusted to them according to the directives of the member states and under their constitutional control. The European "nucleus" now runs the risk of limiting the part to be played by the projected common authority, as well as its freedom of action, to an excessive extent. The result would be merely to transfer the national rivalries from the national chancelleries to the various offices of a joint authority. The United States went through a similar development more than 150 years ago, and even the first Swiss federal Constitution needed a period of consolidation. It is therefore better to be content with a modest beginning than to try to press for too rapid a development and thus provoke nationalistic protests. Eventually, world political and economic developments will inevitably bring about an expansion of the pattern of coöperation within the European "nucleus".

At first sight the other federalistic projects still appear rather nebulous; this statement applies to the agricultural project ("Green Pool") and the health organization ("White Pool"). On the other hand, the Transport agreement, originally aimed at creating a supra-national organization, has now assumed the form of an inter-governmental arrangement. If the EDC and European constitution come into being, then all these initiatives—

and many more—will be swept along by the political wave and carried on to conclusion. Then they could become useful contributions to a common structure—whereas today they are only the object of preliminary studies.

Conclusion

Nobody in Western Europe—barring the Communists—contests the fact that a higher degree of coöperation must be attained. Disagreement prevails, however, as to the form and extent of such coöperation, and also with respect to the safety clauses that many countries want to include in these agreements, in order to be able to withdraw if ever such coöperation would impose upon them any substantive deviations from their national policies. Many countries, like Great Britain, and many political parties, like the Gaullists and the German Social Democrats, therefore refuse to accept integration as a form of coöperation. Others accept the basic idea, but dilute it with too many reserves and "escape clauses"; this applies particularly to certain Belgian circles. However, the difficulty which all encounter is that no nation can give up even part of its sovereignty without being sure that the organization for which it divests itself of its sovereignty is in position to assume the tasks entrusted to it. In America and in Switzerland the experiment succeeded—but how different are the conditions in Western Europe. This may explain, and to a certain extent even excuse, the resistance and hesitation shown by many politicians.

Nevertheless, the integration of the European "nucleus" and the expansion of Western European coöperation inch forward. The exercise amounts merely to building single parts of an overall construction project, and in this connection the question might well be raised whether this is the right method of proceeding—to lay a brick here one day, to pierce a door there another day, being fully familiar with all the master plans, but not really sticking too closely to any one of them. The only reply to this is that it is far better to seize every opportunity to advance the common undertaking, than to stop work altogether. Undoubtedly it will be possible to use each partially finished structure at a later date, the day when final integration becomes a

reality. The Coal and Steel Community is guaranteed for fifty years to come, and the other inter-governmental organizations will certainly continue to exist. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation may have terminated its original tasks, but it, as well as the Council of Europe, is carrying on such useful studies and preliminary work that nobody would wish to eliminate either of them. As to the European Payments Union, a gratifying consolidation took place during the last months of 1953, but this organization, although extended for only one more year, cannot be dissolved until free convertibility has become a fact for all its members. Similarly, the European "nucleus" will not be able to attain a degree of real integration unless and until it adopts a common constitution and transfers to a joint organization that part of each government's tasks which none of the countries themselves are able to perform efficiently, even under optimum conditions. This experiment was undertaken in 1952, and negotiations will continue. But the main part of the work still remains to be done. If the effort to establish the European Defense Community fails, which at this writing is one of the closest questions on record, the activities of the Coal and Steel Community and the rest of the joint organizations will not be able to overcome the deadlock which the integration efforts would then have reached. The elements existing today only constitute single steps, which do not reach the top floor. To get up there the whole staircase is needed.

Disagreement prevails in Western Europe as to whether integration should be approached from the political angle, a theory advanced by the advocators of a joint constitution—primarily P. H. Teitgen of France and Heinrich v. Brentano of Germany—or from the economic angle, as recommended originally by Jean Monnet and now mainly by the Dutch Foreign Minister J. W. Beyen. Economic agreements have a more immediate impact than political approaches. Furthermore, on a political terrain considerable resistance among the broad masses might be encountered, whereas the same masses generally do not violently react to economic questions. On the other hand, violent resistance to economic reforms is generally encountered

in the economic circles which are most immediately affected. One school of thought believes that, for a long time to come, Europeans will probably be compelled to stay within the limits of the possible rather than to undertake what they consider desirable; the best solution will therefore be to press the reforms which seem to have the greatest chances for success in each field. The opposite school of thought—among whose supporters are Jean Monnet, P. H. Teitgen and apparently also Paul-Henri Spaak—is of the opinion that the creation of a European constitution would free the way for all the other reforms which are considered desirable. An academic discussion as to whether political or economic questions should be given priority will not shed any light on the situation, and can hardly be expected to lead to positive results.

The common denominator of all these difficulties is the inveterate nationalism of the Western Europeans, which is far less constructive than the corresponding feeling on the part of Americans. Western European nationalism has become ever more denatured and subconsciously connected with material interests: people adopt a nationalistic attitude because the stronger their state, the more advantages it will be able to offer them. Only a long process of reëducation can solve this problem. The generations which were brought up in a thousand-year tradition of European jealousies and mutual distrust will hardly be open to the argument raised in favor of integration as the sole solution for the problems of our time.

Thus the integration of the European "nucleus" and the broadening of organized coöperation in Western Europe still call for much time, and above all for patient educational work. The fact that this educational work has hardly begun, and that it has hitherto not been given the attention it deserves in any quarter, is hardly promising for the future. This is the crux of the problem: the peoples of Western Europe must learn to think "European" before their countries will be able to form a United Europe.

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