International Integration: The European and the Universal Process

Ernst B. Haas

International Organization, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer, 1961), 366-392.

Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28196122%2915%3A3%3C366%3AIITEAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M

International Organization is currently published by The MIT Press.

INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION

The European and the Universal Process

ERNST B. HAAS

I. European and Universal Integration

The established nation-state is in full retreat in Europe while it is advancing voraciously in Africa and Asia. Integration among discrete political units is a historical fact in Europe, but disintegration seems to be the dominant *motif* elsewhere. Cannot the example of successful integration in Europe be imitated? Could not the techniques of international and supranational cooperation developed in Luxembourg, Paris, and Brussels be put to use in Accra, Bangkok, and Cairo, as well as on the East River in New York? Or, in a different perspective, will not the progress of unity in Europe inevitably have its integrating repercussions in other regions and at the level of the United Nations even without efforts at conscious imitation?

Such a development would be most satisfying. Presumably it would contribute to world peace by creating ever-expanding islands of practical cooperation, eventually spilling over into the controversy-laden fields which threaten us directly with thermonuclear destruction. The functionalist theory of international peace might be put to work by a generalization of the European mode of post-1945 international cooperation. Further, those who hope to contribute to the peaceful solution of conflict could take much solace from such a development, for the post-1945 European mode of resolving conflicts among states has demonstrated that "there often comes a moment when there is a simultaneous revolution of interests on both sides and unity precipitates itself," to quote Mary Follett.[1]

Before abandoning ourselves to such pleasant speculation, however, we would do well to state systematically what we have learned about the causes of European integration and then to investigate where else these causes might be operative. This effort calls for some definitions.

We are interested in tracing progress toward a terminal condition called *political community*. Successful nation-states constitute such communities and subsequent amalgamations of several such states may also form communities. A variety of constitutional and structural factors are compatible with this notion; political community exists when there is likelihood of internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with mutually antagonistic claims. The process of attaining this condition among nation-states we call *integration,* the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift

ERNST B. HAAS is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California in Berkeley. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Rockefeller Foundation and of the Institute of International Studies of the University of California in the preparation of this article.

[1] As cited in Metcalf and Urwick, eds., *Dynamic Administration,* New York, Harper & Brothers, 1940, p. 40.

their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. It should be noted that the objective economic, social, and communications "factors" often identified with "integration," in my scheme, are conditions typical of an ongoing political community. At best they may serve as indicators to help us assess the progress of integration.

This focus precludes attention to what may be called the "immanent myth" of European unity which owes its inspiration to cultural-historical antecedents considered equally relevant to the contemporary process of integration. It appears to me that European unity under the Roman, Frankish, and medieval Roman-German imperial realms has no more analytical importance than the unity of all Islam in the eighth century, the domains of the Ming Empire in the fifteenth or the Guptas in the fifth. The mere fact that specific regions were unified politically and culturally at one time seems not to prevent them from subsequently dividing into warring nations denying in their conduct the cultural unity the historian wishes to impute to them: they do not then constitute any kind of political community. If this is so we cannot use some previous historical experience which involved the notion of community as an argument for assuming the natural and inevitable re-emergence of this happy state of affairs. It may indeed emerge, but in response to the factors we shall discuss. Naturally, in the political advocacy of integration by some specific movement, the "memory" of a historical community may play its part in the construction of a myth; but this does not make the past an active causative agent. On the other hand, a series of traumatic events vividly remembered by a generation subjected to integration may launch and then spur the process. The role of two world wars of unprecedented destructiveness and the threat of the victory of a revolutionary totalitarian movement at the end of the second of these wars were undoubtedly primary among the specific stimuli which, in western Europe, made people receptive to the historical-cultural arguments of the mythmakers. This combination of circumstances does not easily permit repetition elsewhere.

Conflict resolution is a particularly interesting indicator for judging progress along the path of integration. A close study of negotiating processes in international relations suggests the prevalence of three types of compromise, each indicative of a certain measure of integration.

(1) The least demanding we may call accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator. Equal bargaining partners gradually reduce their antagonistic demands by exchanging concessions of roughly equal value. Gains and losses are easily identified, but the impact of the transaction never goes beyond what the *least* cooperative bargaining partner wishes to concede. This mode of compromise is typical of classic diplomatic negotiations.

(2) Accommodation by "splitting the difference" carries us a little farther along the path of integration. As before, demands are reduced and concessions of roughly equal value exchanged among autonomous bargaining units. But in this mode of compromise the mediatory services of a secretary-general or *ad hoc* international expert study group may be admitted by the parties. Conflict is resolved, not on the basis of the will of the least cooperative, but somewhere between the final bargaining positions. This type of negotiation is prevalent in international economic organizations and in other deal-

ings permitting financial identification of gains or losses, such as the formulation of a scale of assessments for Members of the United Nations.

(3) Finally, accommodation on the basis of deliberately or inadvertently upgrading the common interests of the parties takes us closest to the peaceful change procedures typical of a political community with its full legislative and judicial jurisdictions, lacking in international relations. To confuse matters further, this mode of conflict resolution is often identified as "integration," as by Mary Follett, who wrote that it, unlike mere compromise, signified "that a solution has been found in which both desires have found a place, that neither side has had to sacrifice anything."[2] If this is so it must mean that the parties succeeded in redefining their conflict so as to work out a solution at a higher level, which almost invariably implies the expansion of the mandate or task of an international or national governmental agency. In terms of results, this mode of accommodation maximizes what I have elsewhere called the "spill-over" effect of international decisions: policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the task. In terms of method, the upgrading of the parties' common interests relies heavily on the services of an institutionalized mediator, whether a single person or a board of experts, with an autonomous range of powers. It thus combines intergovernmental negotiation with the participation of independent experts and spokesmen for interest groups, parliaments, and political parties. It is this combination of interests and institutions which we shall identify as "supranational." The initial creation of such an agency, of course, demands a creative compromise among the states parties to the effort, based on the realization that certain common interests cannot be attained in any other way. This in turn presupposes that identical and converging policy aims, rather than antagonistic ones, predominated at the moment when the supranational organization was set up.

Each of these modes of accommodation, in addition to specifying a type of outcome relating to intensities of integration, also is typified by appropriate institutional mechanisms. There exists, moreover, a fourth prominent procedural device—parliamentary diplomacy—which is capable of producing any of the three outcomes. Parliamentary diplomacy, as Dean Rusk defined it, implies the existence of a continuing organization with a broad frame of reference, public debate, rules of procedure governing the debate, and the statement of conclusions in a formal resolution arrived at by some kind of majority vote.[3] When bodies like the UN or the Council of Europe define a conflict situation by filtering discussion through this machinery they may also be setting the limits within which eventual settlement comes about, though parliamentary diplomacy rarely defines the actual terms of the settlement. Instead it mobilizes political mediatory forces—the uncommitted states, parties, groups, or persons—whose voice in the settlement process is given volume by the reluctance of the parties to the dispute to annoy the mediating forces. Since the institutional context in which parliamentary diplomacy can be practiced maximizes the representation of a variety of interests emanating from the same nation, it opens up areas of maneuver which are foreclosed in negotiations exclusively conducted by

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[3] Dean Rusk, "Parliamentary Diplomacy—Debate vs. Negotiation," *World Affairs Interpreter*, Summer 1955 (Vol. 26, No. 2), p. 121–122.

carefully instructed single agents of foreign ministries. To that extent it facilitates a greater amount of integration even though it does not necessarily produce outcomes which upgrade common interests.

Where can these modes of accommodation be identified in the history and institutions of European integration?

II. The Lesson of European Integration

Clearly all these modes of accommodation are part of the European pattern of international adjustment. While they do not provide the only indicators of degrees of integration, they appear to be particularly strategic ones in that they focus on decision-making, thereby acting as a summary of, and an abstraction upon, other factors which could also be used as indicators. Broadly speaking, international institutions maximizing decision-making by means of the second and third modes yield the greatest amount of progress toward the goal of political community.

Parliamentary diplomacy is the chief contribution to European unity which can be credited to the various parliamentary assemblies. They have not meaningfully controlled their various executives nor have they legislated in any real sense, though they have attempted and partially exercised powers in both these fields. But they have acted as a spur to the formation of new voluntary elite groups across national boundaries—the European political groups—and the interplay among these has produced a type of diplomatic problem-solving which takes its inspiration from parliamentary resolutions and is able to upgrade common interests. As examples we may cite the work of the Council of Europe in relation to the Saar, in refugee relief and resettlement, and in the relaxation of frontier formalities. We may add the work of the Nordic Council in the negotiation of the now superseded Nordic Common Market Agreement. But let it be admitted at the same time that the total contribution of parliamentary diplomacy is not very great. It found no institutional outlet at all in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC); yet that organization's contribution to integration was substantial even though it operated primarily on the level of accommodation by "splitting the difference."

The most successful institutions in Europe are the "Commmunities" of the Six, constitutional hybrids which once caused nightmares to the public lawyer. They facilitate the resolution of conflict by virtue of all three modes, but the upgrading of common interests is their true contribution to the art of political integration. All fundamental decisions are made by the Councils of Ministers. But they are decisions based on continuous compromise, constantly informed by generally respected expert bodies with constitutional powers of their own and in constant contact with supranational voluntary associations and interest groups. The character of decision-making stimulates interest groups to make themselves heard; it spurs political parties in Strasbourg and Luxembourg to work out common positions; it creates an enormous pressure on high national civil servants to get to know and establish rapport with their opposite numbers; and it sharpens the sensitivities of the legal profession to European norms and political processes in preparation for the inevitable flood of litigation before the Court of Justice. In short, many of the decisions are integrative in their immediate economic consequences *as well as* in the new expectations and political processes which they imply. It is this indirect result which is maximized by the mixture of institutions which usually achieves accommodation at a higher level

SUMMARY OF INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE OF EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS

Organization	Institutions	Mode of Accommodation and Functions		Ideological-Social Environment
OEEC-EPU Age: 12 years	inter-governmental; weak secretariat; strong autonomous expert bodies	upgrading common interests:	remove trade barriers;	mixed ideologically, economically, social structure
		splitting difference:	divide US aid; emergency distribution of goods;	
		minimum common denominator:	planning for long-range economic growth	
Council of Europe Age: 12 years	inter-governmental; interparliamentary; weak secretariat; rudimentary judicial institution	minimum common denominator:	European integration in general;	mixed ideologically, economically, social structure, though united on democracy
		minimum common denominator plus parliamentary diplomacy:	European legislation;	
		splitting difference and parliamentary diplomacy:	solution of specific short-range problems	
NATO Age: 13 years	inter-governmental; interparliamentary; strong secretariat; strong autonomous expert bodies	minimum common denominator:	integrated defense policy;	mixed ideologically, economically, social structure, and in military power
		splitting difference:	coordinated foreign policy; joint defense economics;	
		upgrading common interests:	planning for new weapons and strategy	

Nordic Council Age: 8 years	inter-governmental; inter-parliamentary	parliamentary diplomacy plus minimum common denominator:	economic integration; legal standardization; social security harmonization	homogeneous ideologically, but mixed in social structure and economic development
Benelux Age: 17 years	inter-governmental; inter-parliamentary	minimum common denominator:	economic integration	homogeneous on all counts, except role of agriculture
EEC ECSC Euratom Age: 9 and 4 years	supranational	upgrading common interests: splitting difference: minimum common denominator:	economic integration in long run; solution of short-run economic problems; labor mobility; nuclear planning	homogeneous on all counts (except in southern Italy)
Western European Union Age: 6 years	inter-governmental; inter-parliamentary; weak secretariat; strong autonomous expert bodies	parliamentary diplomacy plus minimum common denominator: upgrading common interests:	foreign policy coordination; arms control	homogeneous on all counts except separate UK ideological position and special German military position
EFTA Age: 3 years	inter-governmental; weak secretariat	splitting difference:	remove trade barriers	mixed on all counts

of agreement as compared to the initial bargaining positions of the parties. Earlier decisions, including the ones constituting the Communities, spill over into new functional contexts, involve more and more people, call for more and more inter-bureaucratic contact and consultation, thereby creating their own logic in favor of later decisions, meeting, in a pro-community direction, the new problems which grow out of the earlier compromises.

Intergovernmental institutions of the classic variety, even when assisted by respected international civil servants and advisory boards, have not been able to match this performance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and OEEC, for reasons to be explored, have continued to make their contribution to integration by means of compromises based on techniques found also in the United Nations. They have transcended these only in relation to certain tasks hinging around the direct implications of the welfare state.

This brings us face to face with the key question of which organizational *functions,* or tasks, have contributed most to the process of integration in Europe. The superficial answer clearly points to the field of economics; but by no means all organizations with an economic competence have performed equally well and few of them solve their problems on the basis of upgrading common interests. Parliamentary diplomacy has apparently been of importance in advancing economic integration only in the Nordic Council; OEEC functioned on the basis of "splitting the difference" or compromising on the level of the minimum common denominator in all areas except those relating to currency convertibility and the removal of quotas (in which common interests were indeed upgraded). The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) has not taken strides comparable to those of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

Not merely economic tasks, therefore, but the degree of functional specificity of the economic task is causally related to the intensity of integration. The more specific the task, the more likely important progress toward political community. It is not enough to be concerned with the reduction of trade barriers or the forecasting of industrial productivity. Specificity of task is essential, with respect to such assignments as creating a common market for narrowly defined products, unifying railway rates, removing restrictive practices in certain branches of industry, removing import quotas by fixed percentage points during fixed periods, and the like. Functional specificity, however, may be so trivial as to remain outside the stream of human expectations and actions vital for integration. This would seem to be the case with the standardization of railway rolling stock, for example, or the installation of uniform road signs. The task, in short, must be both specific and economically important in the sense of containing the potential for spilling over from one vital area of welfare policy into others.

Non-economic tasks have shown themselves much more barren. The cultural activities of the Council of Europe lack a focus on intensely experienced human wants. Its emergency aid measures have been short-range and its contributions to the solution of political tensions non-repetitive. The "European review" function is much too vague to yield observable results. The standardization efforts of the Nordic Council lack the stimulus of controversy and debate: they are so deeply rooted in the Scandinavian setting that one suspects integration of proceeding even without the Council. Continuous contact among civil

servants and ministers is capable of contributing to integration in narrowly defined areas even without the participation of parliamentarians. The only functionally specific assignment of the Western European Union (WEU) is the supervision of the arms aspects of the Paris and London Agreements (1954). This function is being carried out in a supranational manner, but the reason is in the non-controversial and non-recurrent aspect of German rearmament, at least at the intergovernmental level. The other activities of WEU are unlikely to be remembered by history.

What about the field of European conventions? Surely these are specific in content and many of them relate to economics and welfare policy. The fact remains, however, that their very content reflects merely the minimum common denominator among the existing practices and policies of the member states, and that the Council had to resort to the device of "partial agreements" to get beyond this level. Conventions which depart from this denominator tend not to be ratified by the country whose standards are below the norms fixed in Strasbourg.[4] Integration, therefore, is advanced by the European conventions only to the extent that their content calls for a new—a supranational—political process which can generate new expectations and policies. This, probably, is the case only with reference to the field of human rights, a very significant field indeed. Moreover, there recently evolved in the Council the practice, among the members of the Committee of Ministers, of reporting annually on the willingness and speed of ratifying conventions. While this practice falls short of supranationality it nevertheless exposes the reporting country to the possibility of criticism and pressure.

Military and defense questions have not displayed a close affinity to integration unless the issue involves the related question of saving and allocating resources for welfare measures. NATO's experience in the financing of infrastructure programs, weapons research, integration of air warning systems, and the switch to centrally-controlled nuclear deterrents indicates that the upgrading of common interests does take place—not without obstacles and delays—when the economic burdens of defense for small countries are considered incompatible with their welfare commitments. But the other activities of the Atlantic Alliance make plain that more primitive modes of accommodation continue to flourish and that integration is more pronounced on paper than in the command post, the procurement center, and the council chamber.

This survey of the functional lessons of European integration leads to the inevitable conclusion that functional contexts are autonomous. Integrative forces which flow from one kind of activity do not necessarily infect other activities, even if carried out by the same organization. OEEC could not repeat in the field of tariff bargaining the results it obtained on questions of convertibility. NATO cannot transfer its success in planning strategy for new weapons systems to the standardization of the enlistment period; and ECSC has shown itself more adept in negotiating cumulative compromises on the creation of a common market than on short-run solutions for the coal crisis. Decisions made by identical officials, in organizations with a stable membership, in a non-revolutionary socio-ideological setting with similar institutional characteristics nevertheless vary sharply, in terms of their integrative impact, depending on the functional con-

[4] The conventions dealing with the equivalence of university degrees and the movement of persons are exceptions to this generalization. Both of them involved some measure of upgrading common interests.

text. If this is true even in the European setting, how much more true is it likely to be in the United Nations. But the converse proposition is equally important: the autonomy of functional contexts means that disintegration in one range of relations among certain states does not necessarily imply parallel disintegration in other relations among the same states. Thus the breakdown of the Free Trade Area (EFTA) negotiations did not entail a retreat from monetary convertibility; NATO's work on unifying air raid warning systems was not interrupted by the split between the Six of EEC and the Seven of EFTA.

The attempt to compare the European experience with efforts elsewhere compels attention to the environment in which the process of integration is taking place, what some scholars call the "background" factors. This investigation will show that while "Europe"—in the largest sense of the nineteen countries west of the Iron Curtain—possesses no completely common factors at all, significant islands of almost identical environmental factors exist among certain of them.

Social structure provides one set of factors. With the exception of Greece, Turkey, Portugal, parts of Spain, and southern Italy, the western European social scene is dominated by pluralism. Articulate voluntary groups, led by bureaucratized but accessible elites, compete with each other more or less rationally for political power and social status. The population is mobilized and participates in this process through affiliation with mass organizations. In the countries mentioned, however, effective and functionally diffuse social relations prevail.

Economic and industrial development furnishes a second set of factors. With the exception of the same countries plus Ireland, we are dealing with a very high level of economic development—including that of the countries in which the dominant products are agricultural—from the point of view of productivity, investment, and consumption. Significantly correlated with industrialization we find the usual high degree of urbanization and ever-growing demands for government services and durable consumer goods. We also find increasing demands on limited natural resources and greater dependence on foreign (or regional) trade. But note some partial exceptions: Norway's industrial weakness compared to that of Sweden, Belgium's agricultural inefficiency compared to that of the Netherlands.

Ideological patterns provide the final set of factors. Since policies of integration are, in the first instance, advanced or blocked by the activities of political parties and their ministers, parties may be used as an index of ideological homogeneity. A given cluster of countries is ideologically "homogeneous" if the divisions among the parties are, very roughly, the same among all the countries in the cluster, when the principles professed and the concrete socio-economic interests represented by the parties are roughly analogous on both sides of a frontier. Given this definition, the Scandinavian countries emerge as ideologically homogeneous among themselves (with the partial exception of Iceland) but quite dissimilar from the rest of Europe. The Benelux countries, West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria seem homogeneous and seem to have considerable affinity for Italy and France. But a disturbing element is introduced here by the large anti-parliamentary minorities in France and Italy. Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Turkey lack the typical European socio-economic structure and therefore the appropriate party systems; they do not fit into any neat ideological package. The British and Irish parties show some affinity

for their continental colleagues, especially the socialists, but the patterns of interest aggregation and political style differ sufficiently to prevent the positing of a homogeneous pattern. We therefore have two large ideological clusters: 1) Scandinavia, and 2) the Six (plus Switzerland and Austria), as well as a number of single national systems whose characteristics seem *sui generis*.

Let us relate these environmental patterns to the integration process. Integration proceeds most rapidly and drastically when it responds to socio-economic demands emanating from an industrial-urban environment, when it is an adaptation to cries for increasing welfare benefits and security born by the growth of a new type of society. In the words of two European scholars:

> For decades industrialism has been revising the workways and consuming habits of people everywhere. It has enabled cities to grow and the urban way of life to spread. Urbanism is the great outreaching dynamic, breaking down isolation and encroaching upon tradition. Modern industrial urbanism is innately inimical to any isolation. It demands access and stimulates mobility. As earlier it resisted being confined to city walls, now it resists being confined to limited political areas. This resistance to confinement is greater than the resistance against the encroachments. In the measure that industrial urbanism has gained in this contest against the rooted barriers —in that measure integration is needed. The effort toward European integration reflects this need of industrial urbanism for wider organization.[5]

I reject the teleological aspects of this statement. In terms of a social process based on rational human perceptions and motives, no mere concept "calls for" or "needs" anything: a discrete set of group motives, converging with motives of cognate groups from across the border, results in a certain pattern of policy; the aims and the policy reflect demands born from the environment, and the later policies may well change the environment in a wholly unintended fashion. Only in this sense, then, does industrial urbanism favor integration. Because the modern "industrial-political" actor fears that his way of life cannot be safeguarded without structural adaptation, he turns to integration; but by the same token, political actors who are neither industrial, nor urban, nor modern in their outlook usually do not favor this kind of adaptation, for they seek refuge instead in national exclusiveness.

Thus, countries dominated by a non-pluralistic social structure are poor candidates for participation in the integration process. Even if their governments do partake at the official level, the consequences of their participation are unlikely to be felt elsewhere in the social structure. Hence the impact of European integration, in all its aspects, has been minimal in Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Finally, sufficient ideological homogeneity for value-sharing among important national elite groups is essential for rapid integration. The implications for Europe are obvious as reflected in the differential rates of progress toward political community which have been made within Scandinavia, within the Six, and within Benelux compared to the all-European level represented by OEEC, NATO, and the Council of Europe.

In addition to these environmental considerations, which relate to the internal

[5] Jan J. Schokking and Nels Anderson, "Observations on the European Integration Process," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, December 1960 (Vol. 4, No. 4), p. 409.

characteristics of the region undergoing integration, there are often external environmental factors of importance. Fear of a common enemy is an absolutely necessary precondition for integration in military organizations: without the Soviet Union there would have been no NATO. But the common enemy may be a more subtle manifestation, such as fear of external groupings of culturally and economically suspect forces: such considerations were not irrelevant to the "third force" argument which entered the integration process among the Six and is apparent in the convergence of interests which resulted in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). While external environments produce motives favoring integration, they are never sufficient in themselves to explain the rate and intensity of the process.

Institutions, functions, and environments provide useful categories for arranging the human data among which our various modes of accommodation made themselves felt; but they do not exhaust the list of crucial given factors of which we are all aware and without which the process of integration simply cannot be discussed. Variations in national policy, for instance, are fundamental to the life of international organizations, especially in agencies which do not possess the institutional power to influence significantly the policy aims of their member states. However, this truism should not be rendered in the all too common form which asserts that differences in *power* among members determine organizational behavior and the speed and direction of organizational response. Variations in national policy provide a power determinant, not in absolute terms, but only with respect to the functional strength of particular states in relation to the specific task of the organization. The military and economic power of the United States in NATO, for instance, is a meaningful ingredient in the life of that organization only when it is brought to bear on infrastructure or procurement negotiations. The fact remains, nonetheless, that changes in the policy needs experienced by member states, reflecting as they do the pressures of the home and of the international environments, create definite phases in the life of international organizations.

Therefore, lessons about integrative processes associated with one phase do not generally carry over into the next because the specific policy context—often short-range—determines what is desired by governments and tolerated by them in terms of integrative accommodations. This, in turn, forces us to the conclusion that types of accommodation, and the associated procedural norms of an organization, developed in one phase of its life do not necessarily carry over into the next. There is no dependable, cumulative process of precedent formation leading to ever more community-oriented organizational behavior, unless the task assigned to the institutions is inherently expansive, thus capable of overcoming the built-in autonomy of functional contexts and of surviving changes in the policy aims of member states.

The importance of this lesson must be illustrated from the experience of one of the more successful European organizations, OEEC, with multilateral accommodation in liberalizing trade and payments —the aspect of OEEC which contributed most to integration in Europe.[6] The typical OEEC procedure included confrontation, collection of detailed information, mediation in closed sessions, and the work-

[6] My discussion of OEEC benefited greatly from the advice and criticism of William Diebold, Jr., and Robert Triffin.

ing out of specific solutions to crises by autonomous bodies of national experts. The procedures were perfected during the period (1948–51) when the chief task of OEEC was the distribution of United States aid, assistance which was conditional on trade and payments liberalization. During the next phase (1952–56) the procedure continued and was remarkably successful in further removing obstacles to intra-regional commerce, despite the cessation of United States aid. Why? Largely because the major national policies continued to be oriented toward liberalization, and the recurrent French and British payments crises could therefore not successfully challenge the multilateral decision-making process; continuing French and British demands for a relaxation of the OEEC Code resulted in successive compromises along the principle of "splitting the difference," but involving the upgrading of common interests in the system of review and accountability which accompanied the relaxation. Since 1956, all this has changed. Further economic integration has become enmeshed in the political issue of the Six against the Seven, with the result that the procedures which had apparently been institutionalized successfully in an earlier phase of OEEC's life have stagnated with disuse. Fundamental changes in national policies provide the crucial explanatory variable.

This process went on in a setting of intergovernmentalism. More than in the supranational setting, an environment of intergovernmentalism permits great freedom to states strongly endowed in a specific functional context. Let us use monetary cooperation as an example. The history of OEEC suggests—as that of ECSC and EEC does not—that certain types of states can use their special bargaining power more readily to get their way. Thus, economically weak countries whose trade is not crucial to the system are readily exempted from the governing norms and play little part in decision-making; but economically strong countries, in terms of total foreign trade *and* credit capacity, possess a *de facto* veto power. Structural creditors whose role in regional trade is secondary occasionally assert a veto power and delay decisions, but their influence is never dominant. Structural or occasional debtors (France and the United Kingdom) with a very important stake in regional trade are able to exercise a constant blackmail power and to succeed in obtaining exemptions from regional rules, since they are immune to the threat of retaliation and responsive only to the techniques of discreet mediation and confrontation.

The lesson of European integration can be summarized as follows:

1. *Institutionally,* supranational bodies most readily lend themselves to accommodation on the basis of upgrading common interests. This is equally true of intergovernmental bodies which permit certain of their expert commissions the role usually associated with the Communities of the Six, such as the OEEC Steering Board for Trade, the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Refugees, and WEU's Armaments Control Agency. These institutions are least susceptible to the alternation of phases and most likely to develop cumulative decision-making precedents.
2. *Functionally,* specific economic tasks resolving policy differences emerging from previous imperfect compromises on welfare questions, but involving large mass interests, are most intimately related to rapid integration. Conflicts may be resolved by all the usual methods, but upgrading com-

mon interests predominates. The tendency toward autonomy of tasks can be overcome only by building into the institutions specific assignments which maximize the spill-over process.

3. *Environmentally,* integration fares best in situations controlled by social groupings representing the rational interests of urban-industrial society, groups seeking to maximize their economic benefits and dividing along regionally homogeneous ideological-political lines. Changing national policy inhibits integration unless compensated by strong central institutions maximizing the spill-over process.

Obviously, integration may take place and has taken place among nations which have few of these characteristics and through international organizations which depart little from the classic intergovernmental pattern. But the pace and intensity of such integration is pallid in such a context as compared to the situation in which all optimal conditions are met. Hence it should come as no surprise that the Communities of the Six represent the most, and the Council of Europe the least, successful organizations in a European spectrum in which all organizations make some contribution to some aspect of the integration process.

III. The Lessons Applied to Other Regions

Before proceeding to a projection of these conclusions at the global level of the United Nations, it might be instructive to see to what extent they can be used to explain progress toward political community in other areas of the world. I have selected three such areas, the European members of the Soviet bloc, the Arab world, and the western hemisphere. Each of these possesses more unifying environmental characteristics in certain aspects than does western Europe. The Arab and Latin American worlds are, respectively, relatively homogeneous with reference to language and religion. They share, less uniformly, it is true, economic underdevelopment and dependence on monoculture. They also share certain ideological commitments, at least if we do not probe too deeply below the surface of ringing affirmations and generous platitudes. The Soviet bloc owes its unity less to any of these considerations than to the organizational and ideological ties among the ruling elites—and these may be undergoing disintegration now!

Whatever assurance may be warranted in our discussion of European integration is not readily transferable to other regional contexts. The generalizations offered for the Arab world and for Latin America do not merit firm theoretical assertion. While recent work on the Soviet bloc enables us to speak with considerable confidence, no similar work has yet been done on integration in the other regions.[7] The generalizations here advanced are therefore far more tentative and should be regarded as strong theoretical possibilities derived from firmer propositions culled from the European context and projected on the basis of information available at the moment.

Soviet Bloc. There are no supranational organizations in the bloc now, nor were the relations which dominated during the Stalin era of a supranational type. On the contrary, the organizations which prevail are intergovernmental and the party meetings which take place seem almost like diplomatic conferences. The law of alternating phases seems to apply, as exem-

[7] See, above all, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960; and George Modelski, *The Communist International System,* Princeton, Center of International Studies, December 1, 1960, and the literature cited there.

plified by the lack of cumulative decision-making and precedent formation. Organizational tasks expand most readily when they are specific; the most continuous type of integrative activity is in the area of joint economic planning with highly detailed objectives. Environmentally speaking, this activity goes on in a setting dominated by a resolution to industrialize, with growing urbanization and a deepening socio-economic division of labor in each communist country, even though totalitarianism precludes the flowering of a pluralist society.

The truly revealing lesson of the Soviet bloc, however, emerges from the organizational context. Actually, integration was *least* successful when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union possessed an organizational monopoly over the process. The Stalin period witnessed a minimum of military cooperation, no joint economic planning, no exchange of information apart from the slavish imitation in eastern Europe of Soviet examples, and no successful value-sharing among fellow communists. Integration was a one-way process in which the aims of the European satellites were simply subordinated to those of the Soviet Union. The brittleness of the structure stood exposed in the fall of 1956. Now, with the occasional flowering of "revisionism," there is little central direction, but, paradoxically, a good deal of practical integration. The dismantlement of the central apparatus of coercion and manipulation yields to a process of voluntary integration based on a calculation of economic advantage, accompanied by the proper dosages of ideological compromise negotiated among equals. The modes of accommodation are as varied as elsewhere, with the upgrading of common interests by no means always victorious. However, the more varied the centers of power in the bloc become, with the implied instability of alignments and unpredictability of compromise patterns, the more likely the emergence of some habits of continuous intra-bloc adjustment by techniques not unlike those of western Europe.

Hence, the essential lessons of the western European integration process seem to hold in the communist setting, with the pragmatic value-sharing of allied communist parties taking the place of interaction among kindred democratic parties. However, the continuation of this process clearly depends on the observation by the satellite rulers of the limits to voluntarism imposed by the Soviets. Imre Nagy demonstrates the non-observance of these limits, while Wladislaw Gomulka exemplifies the principle of limited dissent within a framework of fundamental loyalty to bloc objectives. Unlike other regional systems, voluntary integration in the Soviet bloc depends on the patience of *one* national elite.

Arab States. Institutions in the Arab world contain no trace of supranationality. The Arab League as well as the African organs in which certain Arab states participate are intergovernmental conferences, with either weak secretariats or none at all. While their deliberations are eloquently clothed in the phraseology of Arab Brotherhood and often refer to the lofty aims of the Arab Nation, they result in accommodations based on the minimum common denominator, if they achieve accommodation at all. But this is a symptom of the lack of integration rather than a cause.

Much the same is true of the conclusions which can be drawn from a functional analysis. In principle, Arab institutions have tasks which cover collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes among the members, security against external aggression, economic integration, regional investment, legal harmonization, cultural cooperation, coordination of trans-

port and communication—the list of activities is identical with the European prototype. The only functions successfully carried out, however, are of a purely negative character. While the autonomy of functional contexts is fully intact in the Arab world, none of the tasks show a tendency toward spilling over into new areas of common concern, and many show evidence of periodic atrophy. Nothing of consequence has occurred toward economic and legal integration, though some common transport policy measures have been elaborated. The most striking successes were the defense of the Middle East against Western and Israeli policy. Arab unity has been sustained in keeping up the economic-diplomatic boycott of Israel and in making common policy against Western countries suspected of neo-imperialist designs.

Security and peaceful settlement among members of the Arab League has been less consistently achieved. When the total international environment made it seem that the consequences of inter-Arab strife (as in the Lebanese-Jordan crisis of 1958) would be destructive for all concerned, the phrases of Arab Brotherhood enshrined in League proceedings were translated into reality. But the same machinery proved quite useless in settling the differences between Egypt on the one hand and Jordan and Iraq on the other in connection with the liquidation of the Palestine conflict. Nor did it help to smooth the quarrels between Nasser, Kassim, and Bourguiba. Whenever the Arab League served essentially as a front for Egyptian national policy its activities were doomed to failure; whenever the convergence of interests permitted a different internal alignment successful mediation took place. In no instance did the League acquire the role of an integrating mechanism standing above the separate policies of its members. Success in highly specific security undertakings, lack of success in other pursuits, the prevalence of the minimum common denominator: these are merely more symptoms, not causes, of lack of integration and progress toward an Arab political community.

The explanation, then, may be found in the environment with its deceptive façade of unity. With the exception of the pan-Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Ba'ath) there are few ideological links of unity among Arab political groups. Each modernizing elite in power, whether an intellectuals' independence movement or the army, acts and thinks only in the context of its state; each traditional-feudal oligarchical elite is intent on preserving its position and rejects cooperation with hostile Arab groups across the border. They "integrate" in meeting jointly experienced threats from outside the region; they cannot meaningfully work together on normally integrative tasks because they experience no common needs. Even in the area of economic development it is the maximization of national resources which motivates elites, not a pooling of resources. In fact, Iraqi nationalist suspicion that Egypt had its eye on Iraq oil may have been a factor in the split among such similarly motivated leaders as Kassim and Nasser. On the other hand, it is possible that a jointly experienced desire in pooling the major Middle Eastern resource—oil—so as to exert greater control over prices and marketing conditions may eventually result in a sufficiently specific convergence of aims to permit the evolution of a vital regional task administered by supranational techniques. This has not yet occurred, but the example of Europe would suggest this as the most likely area of intense integration.

If Europe is to serve as our model, too few of the preconditions for integration

exist in the Arab world to make an imitation of the integration process a likelihood in the near future. If neither the economic nor the social environment bears any resemblance to that of the West, the ideologies which prevail are unlikely to conform to that pattern. Forcible integration—conquest—remains the major possibility, but this would hardly be an application of the European modes of accommodation.

The Americas. Though there are no supranational institutions in the western hemisphere, the fact remains that the prevailing intergovernmental organizations contain bodies which, on occasion, perform as if they were supranational. This is true of the Inter-American Peace Committee and of occasional subcommittees of the Organization of American States (OAS) Council. It is also possible that certain bodies of the projected Central American and Latin American common market organizations will develop such modes of behavior. However, ways of accommodation thus far have never gone beyond the minimum common denominator. They have had distinct integrative consequences because the techniques of consultation have created precedents, subsequently applied in similar situations. Still, it may well be that the determining role of historical phases applies here too, preventing the precedents from becoming cumulative.

Precision can here be gained from functional analysis. Within OAS a growing complexity of economic, social, and cultural organs has resulted only in cumulative inaction: the clashing expectations and demands of the United States and of the underdeveloped Latin American countries have thus far check-mated one another. There has been no expansion of the organizational task, leave alone a spill-over. But the same is not true of the maintenance of security and the peaceful solution of disputes among members of OAS.

A mixture of quiet mediation, admonition, and the threat of economic and military sanctions has sufficed to stop almost a dozen western hemisphere wars since 1945. Why? Essentially because no major ideological issues were at stake. The wars in question involved the mercenary ragamuffins of one oligarchy arrayed against those of another in very minor military skirmishes. It is in these situations that the mediatory prowess of OAS proved itself; here it achieved the institutionalization of precedent. But when this context changes a new picture emerges. Wars involving the issue of outside intervention —whether collective or unilateral—in a civil conflict in which democratic-revolutionary forces are arrayed against a traditional oligarchy (Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Cuba) cannot be readily settled by OAS conciliation. Costa Rica was saved and the Trujillo regime faced with collective denunciation and sanctions because there was a huge majority in favor of the democratic forces in question. But the Guatemalan and Cuban cases show that OAS intervention is considered hostile to modernization and thus cannot easily receive organizational approval. Is it not likely that the very success of OAS in collective security is possible only as long as the issue of interfering with modernization is not involved? If so, we are now living in a new phase in which past precedents will *not* shape future policy, which may imply a decay in the hitherto successful security function of OAS.

The current preparation by OAS of a convention on human rights and of a document concerning the limits of multilateral intervention on behalf of democracy may prove that common interests, for the first time, can be upgraded in this field.

It would imply institutional growth, new tasks, a spill-over, and a definite advance toward political community. While this has not yet happened, it could suggest that economics need not be the chief carrier of the integration process. In fact, this begs one of the most puzzling of questions: can only industrialized nations integrate or can the very fact of underdevelopment be a spur to regional unity? When one super-developed power confronts twenty disunited nations eager for aid, the answer is no. But would this be true if OAS possessed the power to distribute aid on the scale of OEEC under the Marshall Plan? There are two Latin American common market organizations now projected, each using as its *raison d'être* the need for development and the creation of large markets as a spur to industrialization.[8] The tasks imposed by their respective treaties are less precise and more permissive than the Treaty of Rome, and they lack the power to hold out and withdraw economic rewards to their members. The picture for integration seems unpromising, but again it may be too soon to judge, especially since defense against the export prowess and possible protectionism of a united Europe is another factor making for unity in Latin America. Regional unity in Europe may yet father regional unity in Latin America even though the process obeys different impulses.

If this reasoning is correct, the fact of underdevelopment and the prevalence of monoculture may turn out to be environmental factors favorable to integration, though they were hostile to it in Europe. At the same time, social and economic underdevelopment creates major regional ideological affinities, especially among radical socialist-nationalist reformist parties of the *Aprista* type. But regimes and parties have a habit of changing rapidly in this area. Even if they remain in power for longer periods, the preoccupation with purely national development has thus far carried the day. The intensification of the national-revolutionary process may still have the same disintegrative consequences here as in the Middle East.

Returning to our initial propositions, then, let us reiterate that intensity of integration is positively correlated with industrialization and economic diversification. These conditions, in turn, imply an interest in social legislation at the national level; when a regional integration process is launched, the need for an intra-regional harmonization of social legislation is frequently expressed. That being the case, the degree of existing uniformity of such legislation, prepared often under the auspices of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and subject to its continuing review, provides a useful indicator for judging the existence of commonly experienced needs and interests. Table 1 makes clear that the indicator of international social legislation confirms our earlier reasoning concerning the impact of industrialism on integration. The ILO conventions involved, of course, were drafted on the basis of global considerations; even so the interest shown by regional organizations grouping underdeveloped countries is minimal. Table 2 offers similar computations for the conventions concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe, showing their coverage for the important regional organizations within Europe and for certain countries rela-

[8] For descriptions of the Latin American Free Trade Area and the Central American Free Trade Area conventions see *Europa-Archiv*, April 1960 (Vol. 15, No. 7–8), *External Affairs*, April 1960, and *Monthly Review* of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, September 1960. The scheme is defended by Galo Plaza, "For a Regional Market in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1959 (Vol. 37, No. 2). Both conventions have been completed and are awaiting ratification. It should not be overlooked that the driving force behind the negotiations was the UN Economic Commission for Latin America.

TABLE 1

Regional Coverage of ILO Conventions, August 1960

Category of Convention	OAS	EEC	EFTA	NATO	Arab League	All ILO Members
Occupational Hazards (13, 62)	24	67	29	33	19	28
Freedom of Association (11, 87, 98)	48	89	76	75	37	55
Anti-Discrimination (100, 111)	29	33	43	33	25	27
Social Security (2, 3, 12, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 48, 102, 103)	21	51	37	33	13	22
Hours and Vacations (1, 4, 14, 20, 30, 41, 47, 52, 67, 89, 101, 106)	24	31	24	22	14	24
Administration of Labor Legislation (26, 34, 63, 81, 94, 95, 99)	29	57	49	41	14	30
Minimum Age and Protection of the Young (5, 6, 10, 33, 59, 60, 77, 78, 79, 90)	25	55	23	29	5	25

"Coverage" is the ratio of actual ratifications to possible ratifications for all the members of a given regional organization, expressed in percent.

Source: International Labour Organization, *International Labour Conventions, Chart of Ratifications.* The computations are the author's responsibility.

tively aloof from the work of integration. Again, the figures support the proposition that environmentally similar countries, with a common basis in pluralism and industrialism, tend to express the joint interests which flow from this environment in harmonizing national legislation. While the over-all coverage of ILO conventions is about 33 percent, that of the European conventions is 59 percent.

IV. The Lesson Applied to the United Nations

If the attempt to apply categories of analysis developed in the European context to other regions must be treated with caution, the same is true to an even greater extent when we shift our focus to the United Nations. Far from being a finished theory of integration at the global level, the generalizations here advanced consti-

TABLE 2

Coverage of Council of Europe Conventions (as of March 20, 1959)

Type of Convention	Coverage in %							
	Total	EEC	EFTA	Nordic Council	United Kingdom	Greece	Turkey	Ireland
Political Integration (nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 23)	66	61	81	85	67	50	25	50
Economic Integration (nos. 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 25)	56	75	60	53	75	11	0	75
Cultural Integration and International Understanding (nos. 18, 19, 20, 27)	62	63	70	56	100	25	50	75
General Convenience (nos. 16, 17, 22, 24, 26)	50	53	64	60	60	20	40	60
TOTAL	59	63	69	64	76	27	29	65

"Coverage" is the ratio of actual to possible ratifications of each convention in each category. Possible ratifications were so computed as to exclude countries to which specific conventions are not applicable because of their subject matter.

Source: *European Yearbook,* Vol. VI, for the information on ratifications. The computations are the author's responsibility.

tute merely an attempt to subject a variety of international phenomena to the rigor of a unified set of concepts in an effort to narrow the field of analysis to a few central propositions. Hence I continue to apply the ordering concepts of environment, function, and institution, even though they may lead to less satisfactory results.

To impute environmental homogeneity to the United Nations Member States would be futile. Any superficial examination on the basis of the indicators we used in the case of Europe will demonstrate the absence of pervasive traits common to all Members. More than half of the Member States are non-industrial and underdeveloped; two-thirds, perhaps, lack a rational-pluralistic social structure and continue to exhibit various degrees of traditionalism; totalitarian, democratic, and oligarchical regimes are represented in about equal numbers. Most important, perhaps, the ideals of Member States run the gamut from the advocacy of revolutionary change to the staunch defense of some status quo. The UN environment, in short, is volatile and dynamic: it changes with every admission of a new Member, with every revolution, almost with every election. The western European environment, in contrast, is the epitome of stability.

This, obviously, implies a marked systemic dependence on historical phases. The UN during the period of deceptive inter-allied unity was one kind of system; it functioned very differently during the subsequent period of United States–NATO supremacy, to give way to still another mode of action when neutralism came into its own with the mass admission of new Members in 1955. The advent of the African states and the eventual obsolescence of the whole colonial issue is certain to create a new environment again. Environmental instability is much greater than in any regional example here investigated, and the performance of the UN system is proportionately uneven.

In fact, the environment was singled out for initial attention here because it imposes on the UN an entirely different species of organizational life as contrasted with regional systems. Regional integration responds to certain *common* environmental features, no matter how elusive or temporary; it is based on certain common needs experienced by all participants, often in defense against some outside force. Nothing of the kind is true in the UN. The United Nations system represents the cohabitation of enemies, the institutionalized attack-and-retreat of hostile forces seeking to get the better of each other by peaceful means, but without any intention of deliberately emphasizing what they may share in common. Integrative consequences flowing from this game are wholly unintended, though none the less real when they do occur. Consequently, it is idle to expect stable agreement on the primacy of certain tasks in the UN; the volatile environment is responsible for a shifting perception of necessary and common tasks, thus interfering with the functional specificity desirable for integration.

It would be a mistake to conclude from this picture that the institutions of the UN may be dismissed as irretrievably impotent. The UN institutional structure is so complex and the diversity of tasks so considerable that they extend from pure intergovernmental diplomacy to certain cautious approaches to supranationality. Further, the variety of organs is so great and the conditions under which they function so diffuse that all modes of accommodation can and do flourish under the proper circumstances. Institutionally, then, the system is exceedingly flexible and has shown the most startling constitutional adaptations, often to the chagrin of international lawyers.

But it remains true just the same that the dominant mode of accommodation has been compromise on the basis of the minimum common denominator, though "splitting the difference" is not unknown in the activities of certain specialized agencies. The upgrading of common interests has occasionally been attempted, as indicated in a variety of colonial, economic developopment, and military proposals, beginning with the Baruch Plan. Yet, the record points to the lesson that *successful* UN action or solution of crises has *always* been based on the minimum common denominator, success being judged by the degree of implementation given to UN resolutions. Resolutions, by contrast, which emerge through the process of parliamentary diplomacy and represent the view of a majority sharply contested by the defeated minority never achieve full implementation. Bona fide compromise may resolve individual crises (as in Korea, Indochina, Lebanon, and aspects of the Palestine war), but unless the process yields to more community-oriented modes of accommodation, these remain *ad hoc* settlements of no integrative significance.

Now it is true that the efforts of the Secretary-General, acting in the name of the UN, to deal with certain crises contain a dose of supranationalism and seek to upgrade common interests. By committing the UN to a given course of action (as in the Congo) and subsequently requesting ever larger authority from the Security Council or the General Assembly to enable him to carry out tasks assumed earlier, the Secretary-General causes the accretion of new powers and responsibilities to the UN as a whole. In the European context such efforts often resulted in a permanent growth of community-oriented procedures; in the UN this has not occurred. Member States, in deference to changing policy at home and shifting alignments abroad, will acquiesce in such courses of action in New York and then proceed to sabotage them in the field: UN authority has not increased in the Congo context, not because of Mr. Hammarskjöld's mistakes, but because certain crucial Member States blocked the execution of his mandate. Much the same is true of the UN operation in Suez. The claim for supranational powers and the desire to upgrade common interests in peaceful change and relative stability—both of which do grow out of crises dealt with by the UN—run afoul the persistence of Member States to use the techniques only for the advancement of their own local policy aims, as exemplified by the conduct of Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, and Belgium in the Congo crisis.

The prevalence of environmental phases in an institutionally weak system results in a paucity of cumulative decisions creating integrative precedents. While this was also true in certain European organizations and in the western hemisphere, it is much more striking at the global level. The first Charter provisions with respect to collective security and enforcement were changed by the Uniting for Peace Resolution, a change which had fallen into quiet disuse by 1955. Powers given to the Secretary-General vary—but do not necessarily grow—from crisis to crisis. Issues which appeared settled reappear a few years later, including major constitutional questions.

But despite all this, one major procedural advance in the direction of political community has shown a tenacious persistence: the role of a *stable* majority in the General Assembly, through the medium of parliamentary diplomacy, to set the limits and define the direction of certain crucial tasks. In the realm of security and enforcement, this has resulted in the enshrinement of the conciliation process,

as executed through the agency of uncommitted nations. But a much more stable majority has imposed its stamp on other organizational tasks, which confirms at the global level that functional specificity bears the major responsibility for integration, and that functional contexts tend toward autonomy in New York as in Strasbourg. Chief among these tasks is the expanding work of the UN in economic development and technical assistance, followed by the significant accretions of authority in situations involving the peaceful transfer from colonial status to independence. The stable core of the majority responsible for pushing these tasks forward is made up of the bulk of Latin American, Asian, and African nations, joined in certain decolonization ventures by the Soviet bloc.

Environmental heterogeneity and institutional weakness need not prevent global integration around certain tasks which command general interest; but it is the political component of the environment which defines the nature of convergence of national aims. Integration in the UN system has occurred, not in the context of purely non-controversial and technical activities which are of equal interest to all Member States, even though of no transcendent importance to any of them, but in areas of convergence due to the major political conflicts of our era. The Cold War, the anticolonial struggle, and the revolution of rising expectations are responsible for the national policy aims which, by converging at the UN, have resulted in new and larger tasks. Furthermore, the dependence of the major powers and their allies in their ideological conflict on the support of nations more interested in anticolonialism and economic development neatly merges these separate strains into one mélange, infusing the Cold War with the colonial issue, and economic development with the East-West ideological struggle. Thus, the universal military-ideological environment based on conflict begets certain areas of common interest in which organizational tasks have expanded.

In the realm of collective security this has resulted in the erosion of a task and in the decadence of institutions of a quasi-supranational character. But in the functional realm of economics the picture is otherwise. Originally, the UN task was the elaboration of universal economic policy tending toward a common world trade and payments system, coordinated countercyclical policies, and continuous consultation on all issues relating to economic stability, including commodity trade. This task was not successfully carried out in the UN, in the International Monetary Fund, or in the Food and Agriculture Organization. Universal economic policy foundered on the ideologically mixed environment which produced irreconcilable demands.

But more specific economic aims resulted in a spectacular expansion of another task: international investment and related activities of technical assistance. The history of expanded International Bank for Reconstruction and Development responsibilities and operations, the creation of three new UN investment agencies since 1955, and the integration of investment with highly focused and centrally controlled technical aid, through the UN Special Fund, speaks for itself. Further, each decision to expand the UN task was taken on the basis of majority pressure mobilized by parliamentary diplomacy and followed by detailed compromises among the major contributing powers, involving both an upgrading of common interests and a splitting of the difference. Routinized administrative control by international civil servants may follow even-

tually, thus submitting national development programs to an integrating process. The upgrading of common interests would then continue to be manifest in the flow of decisions made by such agencies as the Special Fund. While this has not yet happened, it should at least be noted that the controls exercised by the Special Fund are much more rigorous than is the supervision of the Technical Assistance Board.

Anti-colonialism suggests a parallel lesson. The irreconcilable demands implicit in the environment prevented the firm but general colonial policy from developing which is suggested by the UN Charter. General discussions on colonialism included ample invective but no concrete solutions. Peaceful change, as a regular integrative process in UN organs, was not in evidence with reference to colonial disputes. But the very Cold War pressures which resulted in progressive compromises among the major powers in the economic development field also brought pressure on the West to yield to the anti-colonial demands mobilized through parliamentary diplomacy. The result was a recurrent pattern of enhanced UN responsibility with respect to assuring a peaceful transition to independence in the case of specific territories facing specific problems, through the processes of the trusteeship system. Somewhat more generally, this constellation of forces brought about an institutionalized increase in the procedural powers of the UN to hear and deal with complaints. If "peaceful change" means the gradual yielding of one type of policy in the face of the onslaught of another, minimizing violence, and relying on parliamentary diplomatic pressure allied with Cold War overtones, the demise of colonialism under UN auspices provides a striking example of task expansion. In contrast to the collective security function, the existence of a stable UN majority on the colonial issue has brought about cumulative precedents on procedure that may survive the historical phases which buffet the universal system.

Let us complete this functional survey with a word about universal human rights. I suspect strongly that here the dominance of phases reasserts itself and that the integrative role of this function, which exists at the regional level, will have no global counterpart. The prominence of universal human rights in UN discussion is due almost solely to the desire of Member States to score propaganda points off one another: initially the West used the issue to embarrass the Soviet Union; now the Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Soviet blocs are tactically united in using the issue to embarrass the West on the colonial and overseas investment issues. The imminent end of colonial rule will destroy this tactical alliance and create a new UN phase. Then, it is highly doubtful that either the Soviet Union or the underdeveloped countries with totalitarian tendencies will be eager to create a system of universal private rights or a scheme of international accountability. In the European context the protection of individual rights could have integrative results just because the pre-existing environment was already homogeneous, a point much less strikingly applicable in the western hemisphere. But no integrative consequences can emerge at the UN level if many of the Member States are motivated purely by short-run interests which will not survive the current phase.

This analysis suggests further functional areas in which integrative UN activities could well be undertaken. True, neither colonialism nor human rights is likely to provide opportunities for converging interests in a few years. But economic development will continue to offer a field of action to such aims as long as the current

world tripolarity prevails; in fact, that very condition suggests additional common interests. The peaceful uses of outer space, pooled space research, and UN control over extra-terrestrial bodies are obvious candidates. Less obvious but clearly within our framework of analysis is the field of regulated arms reduction and the increasingly international peaceful use of nuclear energy. These activities involve converging interests among conflicting states; they have a very high spill-over potential and require supranational administrative bodies for adequate control. In short, they evoke the upgrading of common interests in the execution of highly specific programs.

But let us guard against the fallacy that *any* non-political program yields greater integrative results than would a concerted political effort to call into life a world political community. Our European survey makes clear that politically-infused economic tasks, flowing from an industrial environment with a pluralistic society, yield the greatest amount of integration. Other regional experiences do not clearly support this conclusion, but the UN experience conforms, at least, to the economic component in the proposition. Yet the economic work of the UN is obviously less integrative than that of Europe for the institutional and environmental reasons stated. The art of manipulating integration consists in isolating functional areas which produce converging interests among moderately hostile states, and in capitalizing upon those "non-political" aims which very soon spill over into the realm of politics when specific programs are envisaged by strong international institutions. The urban-industrial-pluralistic environment is optimal for this purpose, but not unique.

V. Integration as a Discontinuous Process

Five major conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. Processes which yield optimal progress toward the end of political community at the European level simply cannot be reproduced in other contexts because the necessary preconditions exist to a much lesser degree. Therefore, European integration will proceed at a much more rapid pace than universal integration. Further, other regions with strongly varying environmental factors are unlikely to imitate successfully the European example.

However, it is by no means clear that slightly different functional pursuits, responding to a different set of converging interests, may not also yield integration. The Soviet and Latin American examples suggest that this may be the case. But it is also true that if regional integration continues to go forward in these areas, it will obey impulses peculiar to them and thus fail to demonstrate any universal "law of integration" deduced from the European example.

Integration at the universal level obeys still different impulses. It flows from much more intense conflict than the regional process, in deference to the heterogeneity of the environment in which it unrolls. Consequently, the areas of common interest are more difficult to isolate and the proper specific functions harder to define. In view of the prevalence of phases it then becomes very hazardous to forecast any even and consistent pattern of integration.

The UN effort suffers from the built-in defect that the very economic development and technical aid activities which at the moment constitute its integrative task may create the kind of national environment in which *less* integration will take place a

TABLE 3

Cohesion of Regional Caucus Groups in the United Nations General Assembly, 1945–1958

Caucus	Cohesion of Member States								
	Before Creation of Caucus %			After Creation of Caucus %			During the Whole Period %**		
	Identical	Solidarity	Divided	Identical	Solidarity	Divided	Identical	Solidarity	Divided
African*	—	—	—	46.7	33.3	20.0			
Western European	65.0	23.8	11.2	82.4	11.0	6.6			
Asian-African	11.4	36.4	53.9	34.4	42.2	23.4			
Benelux							77.5	17.0	5.5
Scandinavian							68.3	23.9	7.8
Commonwealth							13.0	27.7	59.3
Arab							63.4	27.2	9.4
Latin American							28.8	33.2	38.0
Soviet							96.0	3.9	0.1

Source: Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958, pp. 64–65, 86, 98, 111, 121–122, 131, 155, 172, 187.

Hovet's study is based on the counting of an "adjusted gross" number of roll-call votes. For the meaning of this device, see Hovet, pp. 239 ff. For an "identical" vote the frequency of members voting the same way, not considering abstentions, is counted; for a "solidarity" vote, the frequency of members of a caucusing group abstaining rather than voting against their colleagues is determined; a "divided" vote covers the situations of direct opposition among members of a group.

*The African caucus had functioned for only two sessions at the time these computations were made, thus precluding firm conclusions. Prior to the formation of the caucus there were not enough African Member States to create a meaningful statistical pattern.

**The caucusing groups listed for "the whole period" were formed before or at the time of the first meeting of the General Assembly.

TABLE 4

Cohesion of Members of Regional Pacts in the United Nations General Assembly, 1945–1958

PACT	Before Conclusion of Pact		After Conclusion of Pact	
	Identical Votes %	Divided Votes %	Identical Votes %	Divided Votes %
ANZUS	75.8	13.8	78.2	5.4
Central Treaty Organization	39.2	26.2	55.0	15.0
Council of Europe	51.0	21.0	43.0	30.0
NATO	47.4	21.1	55.4	21.3
Organization of Central American States	48.3	24.2	67.5	29.8
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization	37.0	34.8	75.0	10.0
Western European Union	—*	—*	75.0	3.6

Source: Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations,* Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958, pp. 196–203.

This computation is based on certain roll-call votes considered as relating to "significant resolutions" on a variety of issues before the United Nations. A panel of outstanding participants in the debates determined which of the votes during each session merited the label "significant." It is Hovet's conclusion that in all instances votes dealing with matters of collective measures and the peaceful settlement of disputes commanded the greatest cohesion among the members of each regional pact.

*Since Italy did not participate in UN debates prior to 1955, no meaningful figure for the pre-pact period can be given.

generation from now. To the extent that the UN effort strengthens national economies and administrative structures it actually may *reduce* the final integrative component. Functionally specific economic tasks found to provide progress toward a political community in Europe may thus have the opposite final effect at the world level. Whether, in some future UN phase, space and nuclear tasks would produce more integration remains an open question.

The element of discontinuity among the various processes is increased by the continued autonomy of the universal and regional decision-making contexts. As Tables 3 and 4 make clear, there is no overwhelming evidence that the members of a cohesive regional system remain united in the UN, nor is there evidence that normally weak and heterogeneous regional systems may not perform cohesively in New York. In short, the contexts remain separate and distinct in the minds of policy-makers, a feature hardly conducive to the elaboration of a unified and global integration process.

A final element of discontinuity must be frankly exposed. Regional integration, because it proceeds more rapidly and responds to a greater number of optimal factors, may eventually slow down universal

integration altogether. The regional process may create a relatively small number of integrated political communities, facing each other in the UN system. In fact, the expanded UN task looking toward pooled economic development and regional agencies in Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere, may actually contribute to this trend. In that case, the growth of fewer and larger political communities will contribute to regional, but not to universal, peace. The universal system will remain what it now is: the arena for minimizing conflict and maximizing common interests in deference to the minimum common denominator.